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Executive Summary 
 
After March 19, 2006 Lukashenka has become victim or even hostage of his own authoritarian 
system. Strong (financial) support of the „siloviki” created preconditions for the unprecedented 
use of violence in Belarus’ history that occured after the election. Corruption revealed itself at all 
levels, and corrupt decision-making and its execution, eventual evidence of corruption in the 
mass media, as well as after-election developments shook the „President’s Vertical” – or 
metaphorical „pedestal” from which he rules – and raised the question: who will be the boss in 
Belarus after the election?   
 
On the other hand, the excessive cruelty of the regime enhanced human and civic solidarity. 
Rather than political views, simple human values created the core of this solidarity. Although 
this appeared to be enough to discredit the regime within society, it was not enough to change it.  
 
Success in the democratization of Belarus depends on further coordinated efforts of the 
opponents of dictatorship both in and outside of Belarus. Lukashenka has undermined his 
political reputation, but this could have fatal consequences, if the opposition manages to take 
advantage of the situation. It must demonstrate negative consequences of the existence of the 
regime in order to inspire Belarusian population to struggle against it. 
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The March Sensation: A Surprise for All 
Evaluation of the election outcome by Belarus’ political authorities, but also independent 
Belarusian analysts, appeared to reach expectations, with voters mostly concerned with socio-
economic issues. The majority of Belarusians, who were frightened by the persecution of regime 
opponents, satisfied with the existing socio-economic development, and deprived of alternative 
information sources, unwillingly accepted Lukashenka. Even the announcement of the Central 
Election Commission of the obviously overestimated support for Lukashenka has not drawn 
attention of the major part of Belarusian voters. For them the falsification of the election results 
was highly expected event, something “absolutely” natural.  
 
However, the reaction of at least part of Belarusian youth was quite a surprise1. The toolkit of 
Lukashenka’s unchallenged authority includes persecutions, harassments, and threats, as well as 
financial rewards for political passiveness (receipt of a place of work or study, salary as an 
alternative to political freedom). A reasonable part of the young people has simply ignored the 
consequences.  
 
Belarus’ authoritarian regime is much harsher in comparison with that of Milosevic in Serbia, or 
that of neighboring Ukraine. Lukashenka has done everything possible to ensure “smooth” 
elections. Given the significant progress in Belarus’ socioeconomic development on one hand, 
and large-scale persecutions and threats on the other, the huge crowd was a big surprise for the 
authorities as well as for democrats and analysts. The resistance of democrats proved that 
regardless of the cruelty of the regime, the government’s actions remained insufficiently 
effective and served to consolidate the opposition and heighten the lack of information: there are 
still a significant number of people the authorities are not able to “buy” or frighten.   
 
Lukashenka’s Bad Mood: Unexpected Problems  
At a press conference on September 10, 2001, declaring his “beautiful and elegant victory” and 
answering provocative questions, Lukashenka was calm and relaxed. However, at the press 
conference on March 20, 2006 he appeared to be strained and tensed. He was rude and hostile 
answering the questions of independent journalists. Differently from 2001, there were thousands 
protesting against him at the same time near the Palace of the Republic. Emotional excitement of 
the regime opponents was not Lukashenka’s only concern. A certain emotional contact had been 
established between the crowd and Belarusian policemen.  
 
The situation that time might have been more critical than outsiders thought. Lukashenka could 
lose control of the situation by resorting to physical force toward peaceful protesters. However, 
he could not be absolutely sure the people on the square wouldn’t actively resist. He also could 
not be sure about the eagerness of most of the policemen to obey his orders. Many of them 
served in “unprivileged” police departments and thus, they might feel sympathetic toward the 
protesters. According to unconfirmed sources and indications2, these “unreliable” police 
detachments were sent back to their permanent stations after March 20. Lukashenka apparently 
believes that a gradual weakening of the opposition due to a constant intensive pressure upon its 
activists to be a better alternative to large-scale violence toward opponents of the regime. The 
authorities were definitely able to count on the elite detachments, the special brigades of internal 
troops of the MIA under command of Colonel Dmitry Pavlichenko and police special troops (the 
Minsk OMON) under command of Colonel Jury Podobeda.3 
 
                                                 
1
 According to the author, a participant of mass protests in March, 2006, over 80% of those who took to the streets 
of Minsk and other Belarusian cities and towns were 18- to 32-year-old people. 
2
 After March 20, nearby streets contained only vehicles with Minsk number plates. 
3
 Dmitry Pavlichenko and Yuri Podobed, mentioned in the report of Mr. Christos Pourgurides, are included in the 
list of senior Belarusian officials subject to a visa ban imposed by the EU and US. 
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The Price for Being Active: Large Scale Persecution  
By the evening of March 23, 2006 about 600 people were serving administrative detention 
sentences.4 On the night of March 24, 2006, an additional 400 people, the tent camp defenders 
on October Square, were detained. Due to the lack of “free” cells in the probationary ward in 
Okrestina Street in Minsk, the detained activists were delivered to serve their sentences to 
Zhodino probationary ward, about 50 km away from Minsk. The use of physical force toward the 
detained activists appeared to be “an example of preventive war” for all Lukashenka’s 
opponents. Many of them were reportedly beaten up.5 Moreover, awful living conditions in 
probationary wards were designed to cause certain psychological effect over detainees.6 
 
In Minsk and other regions of Belarus, KGB and MIA have launched persecutions against 
leaders of oppositional parties and NGOs.7 The authorities have been trying especially to isolate 
the coordinators of Milinkevich’s electoral campaign, key figures of the civil society 
mobilization campaign, those able to take people to the streets and organize protest. There have 
been attempts to interrupt the activities of Milinkevich’s headquarters: 8 out of 40 Milinkevich’s 
proxies were serving administrative sentences, while Viktor Korneyenko, deputy head of 
Milinkevich’s headquarters, was severely beaten by strangers. This indicates the possibility of 
targeted eliminations of opposition leaders similar to 1999.8 
 
Violence in Minsk: Vying for Old Times  
On March 25, after the opposition meeting, several hundreds of participants headed to the 
probationary ward in Okrestina Street; the authorities responded with unprecedented violence. 
They used rubber bullets, tear gas and noise weapons against peaceful demonstrators. More than 
100 people were severely beaten and detained. Some mass protest participants were delivered to 
Minsk hospitals in grave physical condition.9 The violence might be a payback for the mass 
protests and justification for the information about alleged preparations for a coup d’état 
disseminated by KGB Suhorenko prior to the elections. 
 
The authorities were finally able to restrain the mass violence. This measure permitted an 
avoidance of widespread discontent within the society. It is questionable, though, how much 
Lukashenka’s personal nervousness or the “siloviki”, namely Viktor Sheiman and Dmitry 
Pavlichenko, are responsible for the brutal attack. It is in the “siloviki’s” interest to hold the most 
important senior state positions, and they are therefore against any liberalization attempts. 
Sheiman and Pavlichenko might have taken advantage of Lukashenka’s order for dispersal of the 
protest and organized a slaughter. According to eyewitness accounts, Pavlichenko was waiting 
                                                 
4
 According to Milinkevich’s headquarters, on March, 22, up to 180 people were detained in Minsk. Many of the 
mass protest participants were imposed administrative sentences. 45 people were detained while trying to deliver 
food and clothes to the people on the square (they were accused of violating the public order and cursing).  
5
 Many were beaten by the OMON forces and received different types of injuries. It is known that Inna Klimetko, 
defender of tent camp, was delivered unconscious to a Minsk hospital. 
6
 The living conditions for political prisoners are much worse than the ones for those facing criminal charges. It is 
known that detainees were deprived of the possibility to use things for personal hygiene. Due to alleged quarantine, 
probationary ward personnel refused to accept deliveries for political prisoners. Usually, there were 11 prisoners in 
cells designed for 8. 
7
 Uras Gubarevich, director of Brest region electoral headquarters of Alyaksandr Milinkevich, head of Brest region 
organization BPF, Zmitser Shimansky, director of Brest city electoral headquarters of Milinkevich, head of Brest 
city organization BPF, and Sergey Malchik, director of Grodno city and region electoral headquarters of 
Milinkevich, head of Grodno regional organization BPF were sentenced for 10-15 days in prison.   
8
 In April 1999, Gennady Karpenko, one of the UCP leaders, faced the same situation. He was attacked by strangers 
near his house. They hit him with a steel rod several times. He died a week later. 
9
 Sergey Otroschenko and Ales Tishuk received cranio-cerebral injuries and numerous bruises. They were delivered 
unconscious to Minsk hospitals. 
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for demonstrators to approach the gap between two abrupt hills. In this location, people could not 
avoid clashing with OMON forces. Peaceful protesters faced batons and rubber bullets.10  
 
Belarus and the world were shocked to see the related TV news. The events on Freedom Day – 
March 25, 2006 – seriously undermined Lukashenka’s reputation in Belarus. Even the majority 
of those who formerly trusted the official media deemed the clumsy attempts of the authorities to 
justify the slaughter as an obvious lie.11  
 
The cruelty of the regime has frightened mostly those voters concerned about socio-economic 
issues. Democracy proponents in Belarus have managed to persuade a politically indifferent part 
of the population to look at the opposition through their own perspective. People have started 
seeing people being unfairly treated, harassed and persecuted, not necessarily oppositionists. 
However, this indignation is latent: there is still no active resistance to the regime. Nevertheless, 
the Belarusian electorate has started to consolidate around the democratic opposition and the 
regime had been exposed as never before to the majority of Belarusians.  
 
The Regime’s Perspectives: Who is Ruling?  
 
Given the strengthened role of the “siloviki”, the authorities might resort to larger-scale violence 
to put an end to protest movements and stabilize the situation in the country. Therefore the use of 
force against the participants of the so-called “Chernobyl March” on the 20th anniversary of the 
Chernobyl catastrophe on April 26, 2006 is a realistic scenario.  
 
The regime will most probably choose a way of further weakening and exhausting the opposition 
by exerting constant pressure over its activists, despite the surprise that harassment and 
persecution did not intimidate those targeted, thereby not reducing the regime’s recent level of 
arrests, house searches, job losses and expelling students combined with physical abuse. 
Members of un-registered organizations – initiators of “mass disorder” – will face increased 
harassment and persecution.12 
 
However, the regime will not be able to totally eliminate the opposition. The March events 
clearly demonstrated the government’s political weakness. By resorting to mass violence, 
Lukashenka only serves to discredit his regime. The question is: will the opposition be able to 
take advantage of this weakness? Could Lukashenka’s opponents gain active support from a 
number of Belarusian citizens sufficient to eventually overthrow the regime? 
 
The international situation around Belarus seems to be changing. The outcome of the 
parliamentary elections in Ukraine does not appear to be satisfactory for Russia: the orange 
“westerners” will obviously support the process of Ukraine’s integration into the EU and NATO. 
Despite this, Lukashenka could not enjoy the previous unconditional support of the Kremlin 
domestically, as the Gazprom statement from March 30, 2006 regarding the increased gas price 
                                                 
10
 It is known that members of Pavlichenko’s brigade used carabines C-23 “Selezen”, designed for shooting with 
rubber bullets and gas. 
11
 State channels broadcasted the videotape that showed 8 allegedly injured members of Pavlichenko’s brigade: casts 
upon clothes, pink cheeked, healthy men pretending to suffer from pain; those who had received different types of 
injuries (arms, legs, eyes) were placed into the same hospital ward, rather than injury-specific wards, with obviously 
non-hospital furniture. 
12
 On March,28, special KGB unit responsible for fight against terrorism and organized crime initiated criminal 
proceedings against four representatives of “Malady Front”: Zmitzer Dashkevich, Syarzhuk Lisichonka, Aleg 
Korbun and Barys Garetsky. They are charged under Article 193 Chapter 1 of the Criminal Code(unlawful 
organization of association or foundation and participation in their activities). Syarzhuk Lisichonak has already been 
detained. 
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clearly indicates. Nevertheless, Russia will keep playing the role of Lukashenka’s advocate, 
defending and representing the regime’s interests in the international political arena. 
 
Perspectives of the Belarusian Opposition: Talk to the Majority  
 
The recent developments in Belarus proved that Alexander Kazulin’s, the social-democratic 
leader and candidate for the president, presence in Belarus’ political arena is a tool for 
weakening the main opposition movement, centered around Alexander Milinkevich. The end of 
their flirtation started with by Kazulin’s attack on Milinkevich on March 2113 and concluded 
with the disagreement between the two leaders on the Freedom Day. The criminal proceeding 
initiated against Kazulin14 and a possible sentence do not necessarily prove his adherence to 
“democratic values”. In case of imprisonment, the privileged status as a “victim of the regime” 
will allow Kazulin to further split the opposition.  
 
On Freedom Day (March 25, 2006) Milinkevich announced the launch of the new civil 
movement “For Freedom!” Thus, the democratic electorate remains consolidated around him. 
This consolidation is the biggest achievement of the democratic opposition in the past years. 
Additionally, tens of thousands of people took part in various forms in the March protests. Given 
the authorities’ efforts to prevent an inflow of potential participants from the regions15, it is an 
unexpectedly high number. Relatives, friends, and colleagues have expressed a level of solidarity 
with protesters that Belarus has rarely experienced. Despite near-total control of media, the 
opposition will be capable to talk to the electorate through internet, phone and interpersonal 
communication. According to independent researchers there are up to 1,000,000 active internet 
users in Belarus. Their number is rapidly increasing. The significant number of people on Minsk 
streets in March was a result of increased level of alternative information, mainly through 
internet and cell phones.  Flash-mobilization after the election helped to mobilize disorganized 
youth for the protest. However, the question is whether this will be enough to increase the 
number of those opposing the regime together with the possibility of direct communication with 
the electorate.  
 
The opposition’s increased capacity to effectively use existing information channels and hold a 
direct dialogue with people is utterly important. Lukashenka’s opponents should pay closer 
attention to socio-economic issues – the major concern for the majority of Belarusian voters. 
Unlike the democratic electorate, they will not take to the streets inspired by “Democracy! 
Freedom! Justice!”, slogans of Milinkevich. The opposition must solve concrete political 
(internal and external), social, economic and other problems. This could be presented through a 
sustainable system of constant communication with the electorate. Through dialogue with people 
working in administration and large enterprises’ employees, the opposition could restore most 
effectively with “siloviki”. This requires direct communication and careful policy consideration 
of problems and interests of this group.  
 
Milinkevich criticized the opposition’s communication with the electorate over the past years. 
According to him, the opposition wakes up usually several months before the elections, and then 
falls asleep again; during its time “awake,” it was mostly concerned with widening its contacts 
within the international community. After the consolidation of the democratic electorate, 
                                                 
13
 On March, 21, Kazulin publicly accused Milinkevich of being “a marionette in his wife’s hands (Inna Kulei)”, of 
being unable to express his own opinion. These videotaped allegations were broadcasted via state TV channels. 
14
 On March, 27, representatives of the MIA declared that Kazulin was charged under Article 342 of the Criminal 
Code with “Organization of group actions violating public order, and active participation in such actions”. The 
Article envisages penalty as arrest for a term of up to 6 months, or restriction or deprivation of freedom for a term of 
up to 3 years. 
15
 Many oppositional parties and regional NGOs faced numerous searches and arrests… 
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Milinkevich must win the sympathy and respect of the majority of Belarusian voters – with the 
same structures of the opposition. Our prediction is that the key factor in this development will 
be played by Belarus’ civil society.  
 
Perspectives of Relationship between International Community and Belarus: Chance for 
Democratization   
 
The decision to hold the Belarus election just a week before the Ukrainian one made these two 
cases even more interconnected. Significant number of Belarusian voters compare their own 
situation that of the neighbors. The majority of the Russian-speaking population of southern and 
eastern Ukraine deems the Belarus-Russia relationship a perfect example for the Ukrainian 
political elite. Russian President Putin uses his Belarusian counterpart as a “loudhailer” for 
Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine, demonstrating the advantages of the pro-Russia political 
course. Solving “Ukrainian” issue is impossible without sustainable progress on Belarus.  
 
On the other hand Lukashenka and his “siloviki” must be aware: the West will no longer believe 
the “overwhelming support” of Lukashenka in his own land and will act accordingly. Russia’s 
next steps – including opening the gas price question right after the election – made the 
Belarusian regime’s only option to warm up relations with the West, especially the EU. Despite 
this necessity, Lukashenka had no other choice but to crash the opposition protest.  
 
Compared to assistance from Russia toward Belarus, democracy assistance to Belarus from the 
West seems less effective and sometimes off-policy. The democracy movement in Belarus 
desperately needs support from international community after the election. Demonstration of 
international solidarity is very important. However, it is even more important to find ways to 
exert leverage over Kremlin-targeted assistance to Belarus. If interested in establishing closer 
cooperation with the West, tougher political and economic conditions must be imposed on 
Russia. Only in this case would Lukashenka have to stop persecution and harassment of 
opposition activists to avoid spoiling the relationship with the Kremlin. Nevertheless, the West 
should not be naive regarding Russia’s future steps against Lukashenka – these will merely serve 
their own interest to control Belarus before the 2008 Russian presidential election. Europe must 
develop the same tough language with which the Belarusian and Russian regime operate with 
Brussels to become the same weight partner. As part of this, the international community should 
prepare an impact analysis of possible smart economic sanctions, a so-called “white list”, e.g. 
Simplification of visa procedures for Belarusian citizens and reducing the visa costs should be 
added to the “black list”, the visa ban for a larger number of Belarusian senior state officials then 
the EU has passed.  
 
Continuing flow of democracy assistance should be target radio broadcasting to Belarus from the 
neighboring countries (including Ukraine), scholarships for expelled students27, and most of all 
increased financial support for civil society and constant monitoring for effective and efficient 
implementation of sponsored projects should be added. Support for NGOs promoting the 
democratization of Belarus, and oppositional parties (through various channels) are equally 
important. Thus, the West can serve more effectively the Belarusian cause to bringing down the 
last and already naked dictator of Europe.  
 
 
                                                 
27
 According to the last available information more than 100 students have been expelled from universities due to 
participation in March mass protests. Most of the students, however, could face serious problems passing the 
summer exams.   
